Dangers of Duality
UMaine political scientist Bahman Baktiari looks at the history, rhetoric stymieing democracy in the Mideast

Sidebar Studying International Affairs The University of Maine's International Affairs Program, directed by political scientist Bahman Baktiari, has grown apace with Americans' interest in Mideast issues since 9-11. The program had 34 majors in 2000; today, that number has nearly tripled to 95 majors in 2004, and now includes a dozen international students.

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March 20 marks the second anniversary of the launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom that led to the occupation of that country by a U.S.-led coalition. The conflict put the Mideast on the map for more Americans than ever before. Coupled with the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian bloodshed and Iran's recent threat of nuclear armament, it also has left people torn between looking at the Middle East glass as half full with opportunity for new democratic institutions or half empty with endless turmoil in sight.

Political scientist Bahman Baktiari understands the roots of such conflicted views and cautions against the dangers of duality, of promoting democracy and freedom while supporting undemocratic regimes.

As one of the University of Maine's leading authorities on the Middle East, Baktiari's perspectives have been getting an ever-wider audience since the destruction of the World Trade Center on Sept. 11, 2001.

Combining the insights of a U.S.-trained political scientist with those of a native Iranian well traveled in the Mideast, the director of UMaine's International Affairs Program has been outspoken in assessing relations between Middle East countries and his adopted homeland.

Pointing out the inconsistencies and expediency in U.S. foreign policy through the decades, Baktiari has been urging Americans to pay closer attention to what's on the minds of the world's 1.2 billion Muslims.

Baktiari reminded a Carnegie Council conference on ethics and U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East about one of the great ironies of American history: "Many ordinary Arabs . . . would rather like some of that democracy and freedom that Mr. Bush has been telling them about.

Instead, they have seen over the past decades how many democratic movements in their societies were crushed by despots supported by the West and using Western weapons. The memories linger."

On National Public Radio, Baktiari pointed out the confusing nature of U.S. foreign policy toward Iran: "The U.S. has shifted several times from supporting the reformists under the Clinton administration," he says.

After President Bush encouraged student demonstrations in Iran, Baktiari warned in an op-ed piece in the Christian Science Monitor: "If anything, U.S. rhetoric fuels antidemocratic forces in Iran, just as Mr. Bush's ‘axis-of-evil' speech benefited the hard-liners who used it as an opportunity to increase the repression of democratic reformers."

Such against-the-grain pronouncements have earned Baktiari a place at the table in shaping the public opinion of Americans and U.S. policymakers unused to thinking much about Middle Eastern problems before or after 9-11. The author of the book, Parliamentary Politics in Revolutionary Iran, The Institutionalization of Factional Politics, his views gained particular national prominence during the Clinton administration after then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright appointed him to an advisory group on Iran in 1997.

"The process of democracy and the U.S. occupation are at odds in Iraq," Baktiari told Bangor Daily News columnist Tom Weber after the Iraqi elections at the end of January. "I see nothing significant to come from this situation unless the U.S. finally learns to pay real attention to the causes of the insurgency, the feeling of dispossession among the Sunnis and the humanitarian issues the country faces."

Baktiari returns to the Middle East to do research two or three times annually. Last year, for example, he was in Iran in January and March to update his book; on his second trip, he also went to Jordan to chair a panel on Islam and elections, sponsored by the New School University in New York, and funded by the MacArthur Foundation and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. In May and June, he participated in workshops in Lebanon and England, and last November, he was back as a keynote speaker on Iran for the Wilton Park Conference.

For this article, Baktiari was asked to sum up his thinking on four questions or issues of interest to Americans.

Q: How do we restore amicable relations with Iran and convince that country not to develop nuclear weapons?

A: Regarding Iran, I think the United States' policy has fluctuated between open hostility and reluctant geopolitical cooperation. For Iranians, Iraq is similar to the China card for the Nixon administration. Iranians know the United States needs them in Iraq and Afghanistan; without Iran's cooperation, there can be no stability in those countries.

In both Tehran and Washington, there is no consensus about how the U.S. and Iran should resolve their problems. In Washington, the hawks favor the invasion of Iran, arguing that logistically it would be easier to pull off than the invasion of Iraq because the U.S. could launch land-based attacks on Iran from adjacent Afghanistan, Iraq and Central Asia. They also allege that Iran is a "rogue" state that has sponsored terrorist bombings in Beirut and Saudi Arabia, and is sheltering Al-Qaeda terrorists.

In contrast, the doves see tremendous difficulties in attacking Iran as compared with Iraq. Iran, they point out, is four times the size of Iraq and has a population three times that of Iraq. It has missiles capable of reaching Israeli and European targets, as well as American interests in the Middle East, and the capacity to instigate Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Israeli-occupied territories against both American and Israeli interests.

The only way Iran and the United States can normalize their relationship is through the European Union's initiative to de-nuclearize Iran. Bush has already acknowledged that we do not have "leverage" with Iran and that "diplomacy must be the first choice" in resolving international issues, including "nuclear armament."

A joint American-European diplomatic approach would make it far more difficult for Iran to renege on its commitment to Europe. Iran has promised to refrain temporarily from uranium enrichment while discussions for European technological, economic and commercial aid to, and political and security cooperation with, Iran make steady progress.

More important, such a joint approach would redound to the benefit of reformist and secular nationalist forces in Iran. It would deprive hard-line conservatives of the opportunity to exploit American and Israeli threats to repress pro-democracy forces.

Just like any other diplomatic problem, the nuclear issue is political. It can be resolved only through negotiation. What happened to the Chinese nuclear issue? Nobody talks about it anymore. What really has happened to all the stockpiles of nuclear bombs in Russia? Nobody talks about it. What happened to all the nuclear stockpiles in Pakistan, an unstable regime today? Nobody talks about it. All these countries have an amicable relationship with the United States, so the latter is not making an issue of their nuclear arsenal.

Q: What does the United States need to do to end the fighting in Iraq, democratize the country and leave?

A: America can improve relations with Iraq if it accepts that Iraq is not a problem just between the United States and Iraq. It is a multilateral problem. America has to accept that fact that other parties, other powers in the region have to be involved, including European countries. And I would go one step further and say America should build stronger relations with the Organization of Islamic Countries. In Iraq, the United States cannot defeat the insurgency alone. The future of Iraq will be decided by the majority of the country.

However, there is a catch-22. To keep Iraq successful and independent, the United States has to disassociate itself. Politicians inside Iraq need to stay away from the U.S. in order to build credibility. But the same politicians need the United States to defeat the insurgency. As a result, Iraqi politicians themselves do not have a clear solution for Iraqi problems.

We went to Iraq thinking we can do anything in a short time. Inevitably, the U.S. has to come out of Iraq in a much more defeated way. There's no way that the U.S. and Iraq can remain together. It's impossible; like oil and water.

Q: What can be done to settle the Israel/Palestinian conflict?

A: I think the biggest mistake America can make here is to pursue a policy that does not seem fair to the Palestinians. We have favored Israel on practically every policy imaginable, and this undercuts our objectivity during the peace process.

I think change will come because both Israeli and Palestinian people are getting tired of endless violence and bombings. I think people inside Israel are frustrated with too much politics played in their name and their country. The majority of Israelis are tired of settlement politics; they do not support the radical ideology of the settlers. Palestinians are tired of blockades, occupation and unemployment. They are desperate for a leader to bring peace and normality to their lives.

So what is happening in that part of the world is that leaders and politicians who are unaware of these factors become irrelevant. This is what happened to Yasser Arafat. He died without achieving his goal of establishing a Palestinian state for his people. The new Palestinian leader, Mahmoud Abbas, is very different from Arafat. Although he has no street support, he is a skilled negotiator and has America's support.

I think there's going to be some tough times between the U.S. and Israel. I will not be surprised if there is some tough language on settlement issues, on withdrawal and on Israel loosening its economic stranglehold of the Palestinian territories. Without Arafat, we have a new beginning, but nobody can predict a new ending.

Q: What can we do about Al-Qaeda?

A: Although some Muslims may identify with Osama bin Laden's message, I have not met any Muslim who agrees with his method and means. Killing Bin Laden will not destroy Al-Qaeda. We need to look at our policies toward the Muslim world in general, and Saudi Arabia in particular. The 9-11 Commission report warns us about this. We have to stop thinking that by capturing Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda is going to stop. It's just like Saddam Hussein's arrest didn't end the insurgency. Al-Qaeda is a terrorist organization that thrives on discontent, alienation, anomie and frustration. The United States needs to address a whole range of political, economic and humanitarian issues in the Muslim world.

For example, the territory in Indonesia hit by the tsunami was very sympathetic to radical Islamic parties in the country, yet the American military's response to the tsunami will change people's attitude toward the U.S.

Unfortunately, I'm afraid that in Iraq we are creating more terrorists for Al-Qaeda, whereas in Indonesia we are shutting it down. We need to bring a better balance.

by Wayne Reilly
March-April, 2005

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